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A RESEARCHER’S PRIVILEGE: DOES
ANY HOPE REMAIN?
ROBERT M. O’NEIL*
I
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and subpoenas coexist uneasily.  For at least a half century, formal
demands for discovery of research results, or research in process, have posed an
acute dilemma for the scholarly community.  A scholar’s unique academic re-
search can, through judicial action, be wrested from the scholar and involved in
often-lengthy litigation.  Courts have struggled to balance the contending inter-
ests, particularly during the last quarter century.  Sometimes the demands are
granted, and sensitive material is required to be turned over to litigants.  Other
times, scholars have prevailed—usually on rather narrow, fact-based principles.
The research topics that have triggered such demands by the judicial system
have varied with the issues of the times.  Perhaps the first such dispute involved
FBI threats to subpoena highly sensitive material on sex research held by the
Kinsey Institute at Indiana University.  Since the Institute had pledged confi-
dentiality to many of its research subjects, its officers insisted it could not com-
ply with the FBI demand and would, if necessary, “accept the consequences of
such defiance.”  In the end, the FBI backed down and a legal resolution was not
required.1
In the 1960s and 1970s, several research issues that reached the courts grew
directly out of the Vietnam War.2  The years since then have brought cases in-
volving demands for disclosure of research on subjects as varied as unsafe
automobiles,3 medical devices,4 and employee morale in large public utilities.5
The 1990s have seen the focus of such litigation shift to research on cigarettes
and their effects.  Mounting pressures on the tobacco industry, chiefly through
damage claims by former smokers or their families, or by states seeking to re-
cover the costs of treating smokers, have intensified the potential importance of
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such research to high-stakes litigation.  Several notable cases6 have pitted the
interests of tobacco companies involved in or preparing for litigation against
the desires of researchers to resist the compelled disclosure of their research.
The large number of cases concerning the issue of compelled disclosure is
due to four devastating effects the disclosure can have on scholarship.  First,
even if documents are sealed after discovery or other safeguards are provided,
once the material has been forcibly removed from the researcher’s files or
discs, that researcher loses control of the reporting and disclosure process.  The
decision concerning when, where, and how fully to make public the results of
research is as central to a researcher’s process of inquiry as the selection of
subject matter and research methods.
Second, the very process of responding to, and then executing, a subpoena
or discovery order may severely hamper the research process.  Should such
demands come at a critical time in the life of a study or experiment—and few
stages are not potentially critical—the resulting disruption is intrusive at best,
and at worst can thwart or truncate the entire research process.  If the demand
involves massive amounts of data, not all of which can be amassed and deliv-
ered without arresting the research process, the potential effects may be even
more harsh.
Third, if compelled discovery reaches into the process and separates some
data or conclusions from others to serve the interests of litigation, it will lead to
the use of unverified information.  Researchers usually need to validate their
results before making them public, or even sharing them with colleagues.
Finally, compelled disclosure raises special concerns of confidentiality.
Where subjects have been assured they will remain anonymous, the risks of dis-
closure are the most obvious.  There are, however, many situations in which re-
searchers would not normally promise confidentiality or anonymity in express
terms, but where an expectation of such treatment would be implied—and
where the researcher’s credibility and future access to a subject pool could be
crippled by such revelations, regardless of who causes the breach.
Thus, there are many strong justifications for protecting research from
compelled disclosure.  Yet, as shall be seen shortly, the courts have been sur-
prisingly resistant to these claims.  In the relatively few cases where claims for
protection of research have prevailed, special circumstances (for example,
over-reaching by a litigant, highly burdensome demands, or the availability of
alternative sources) have helped a sympathetic judge reach such a conclusion.
Elsewhere, the results have been discouraging and the prospects bleak.
The rationale for protecting the research process from compelled disclosure
seems basic and familiar.  Scholarship is as central to academic freedom as is
classroom teaching.7  The 1940 Statement of the American Association of Uni-
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versity Professors (“AAUP”) to which more than 150 organizations and many
more institutions have subscribed, declares in its opening paragraph that
“teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results … .”8  Professor Paul Walter, who served both as President of the
American Chemical Society and of the AAUP, states the rationale in this way:
The ability to conduct scholarly research freely is an activity which lies at the heart of
higher education and falls within the First Amendment’s protection of academic free-
dom.  Research and teaching activities are closely linked components of scholarly ac-
tivity in American higher education.  Academic freedom includes the freedom to
search for knowledge; therefore, it is as much an infringement on the scholar’s aca-
demic freedom to constrain or limit the scholar’s research activities as to limit his or
her freedom in the classroom.9
The protection of research has several facets.  Most clearly, the researcher
enjoys broad latitude in choosing topics for study.  While government may se-
lect certain subject areas or topics as recipients of public funding,10 it may not
favor some viewpoints or messages and disfavor others within an area of
funded research or inquiry.11  Furthermore, the scope of freedom in research
extends well beyond choice of topic, and encompasses the structure of a study
or experiment, the hypotheses or desiderata, the timing of the process, the veri-
fication or validation of initial results, the place and medium of initial release
or publication, and a host of other dimensions that might seem peripheral or
even unrelated to the casual observer but which the serious researcher appreci-
ates.
Even a cursory review of these elements of the research process suggests
the gravity of potential harm that compelled disclosure—especially premature
disclosure—may cause to its integrity.  Thus, one would expect to find in the
courts a solid legal basis for protecting that process and its results.  Upon ex-
amination, one finds far less law than one might expect, and though the state of
that law is mixed, its import for the balance between discovery and non-
disclosure is rather discouraging.
II
RESEARCH AND DISCLOSURE IN THE COURTS
A.  The Early Years
The entire history of research freedom claims in the courts spans barely a
quarter century.  The first two cases, which reached the federal courts in the
late 1960s,  seemed to offer a promising start.  The earliest case involved a
                                                          
An Academic Privilege, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 837, 852 (1983).
8. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in AAUP POLICY
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS 3 (1995).
9. Fischer, supra note 1, at 41.
10. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991).
11. Finley v. National Endowment for the Arts, 100 F.3d 671, 681 (9th Cir. 1996).
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challenge to Indiana’s strict liability obscenity law.  In voiding certain parts of
the law, the court observed that mere possession of obscenity would be
“prohibited to professors and researchers in psychology, law, anthropology, art,
sociology, history, literature, and related areas.”12  Such a prohibition, the court
warned, “would put in violation of the law the famous Kinsey Institute at Indi-
ana University.”  Such a “chilling effect on the research, development and ex-
change of scholarly ideas is repugnant to the First Amendment.”13
The second case involved a Southeast Asian scholar at Harvard University
who had been interrogated by a grand jury seeking to determine how the Pen-
tagon Papers had found their way to the New York Times.14  The court refused
to grant a broad scholar’s exemption concerning information provided by con-
fidential sources.  Rather, the court held that, while a scholar might be com-
pelled to identify persons the scholar had interviewed, protection might be
available for the names and sources of research subjects, like the Vietnamese
villagers to whom the researcher had apparently offered or promised  anonym-
ity, and for government officials.15  The court also seemed willing to shield the
researcher’s own research hypotheses.16  The posture of the case, an appeal
from a civil contempt order, made unnecessary a definitive ruling on these is-
sues and the court since then has never had occasion to revisit this area of the
law.
In one other early and promising case, a Harvard public health professor,
Marc Roberts, had conducted extensive interviews with employees of Pacific
Gas and Electric Company (“APG&E”) in Northern California, during a study
of how utilities make decisions about environmental issues. Later, a construc-
tion company sued PG&E for breach of contract in federal court.  During pre-
trial discovery, the plaintiff suggested that information from Roberts’s study
might bear on the corporate judgment that triggered the alleged breach.
PG&E then sought access to the notes of the study interviews; however, Rob-
erts resisted granting PG&E the right to view his research.
The court ruled against PG&E’s requests for disclosure without reaching
the broad constitutional grounds asserted by Roberts.17  Instead, the court
based its decision on a number of non-constitutional factors: the fact that Rob-
erts was not a party to the lawsuit but rather an innocent bystander; the uncer-
tain probative value to the contract suit of the requested data; and the existence
                                                          
12. Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
13. Id. at 67.
14. United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Popkin v. United
States, 411 U.S. 909 (1973).
15. Id. at 334.
16. Id.  The First Circuit refused to require scholars to disclose their opinions as to the identity of
the leaks to the grand jury for fear that it would cause scholars to “think long and hard before admit-
ting to an opinion” and thus hinder scholarly pursuits.  Id.
17. Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).  Rob-
erts asserted that “compelled disclosure of confidential information would without question severely
stifle research into questions of public policy, the very subjects in which the public interest is greatest.”
Id. at 390.
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of other sources through which comparable data could be obtained without
burdening or intruding upon the scholarly process.18  Clearly sensitive to the na-
ture of Roberts’s interests, the court took special note of “the importance of
maintaining confidential channels of communication between academic re-
searchers and their sources … .”19
Thus, while these early cases seemed quite promising, many cases in the two
decades since Roberts have been more mixed—though some of the later schol-
ars faced with such claims of compelled disclosure have prevailed on narrow
grounds.  Along the way, there have been some kind words about research and
scholarly pursuits, even from courts that in the end offered little solace to em-
battled researchers.
However, there have been several important victories.  Judge Crabb issued
a response sympathetic to researchers20 that was confirmed by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in a judgment that comes about as close as any
court to creating a true shield for research21 when the Dow Chemical Company
sought from a senior University of Wisconsin scientist massive data relating to
an Environmental Protection Agency pesticide ban.  Persuasive to both federal
courts in Dow Chemical Company v. Allen were the following factors: the re-
searcher’s non-party status; the grave risks of premature disclosure of research
findings on a highly volatile topic—the effects of Agent Orange on troops in
Vietnam; the hazards of disrupting research in progress (or diverting the re-
searcher’s time and attention at a critical stage); and the potentially chilling ef-
fects of such subpoenas on the conduct of future research.  While none of these
factors alone, nor all of them taken together, justified a constitutional shield, by
focusing upon potentially serious disruptions of academic research, the Dow
courts came about as close to recognizing a researcher’s privilege as any court
before or since.
The frailty of precedent in favor of researchers soon became clear.  Two
years after the Dow case, the Seventh Circuit reached a substantially less sym-
pathetic view when it revisited compelled disclosure issues in the context of a
pharmaceutical company’s demand for studies of a contraceptive device.22
There was, however, an important factual difference that aids in an explanation
of this disparity:  The district court flatly barred all discovery without any of the
findings of potential impact that Judge Crabb had so carefully made in Dow.
The court of appeals thus needed to do little more than say that some of the re-
quested material might be available without risking grave harm to the re-
searcher and, on that basis, send the case back to the trial judge.  Moreover, the
court of appeals cited Dow with approval, as standing for the view that in such
cases “premature publicity must be guarded against.”23  Partly for that reason,
                                                          
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. United States v. Allen, 494 F. Supp. 107 (W.D. Wis. 1980).
21. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
22. Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 560.
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the Seventh Circuit cautioned in this case that “[n]o discovery should be al-
lowed of any material reflecting development of [the researcher’s] ideas or
stating his or others’ conclusions not yet published.”24  All was, therefore, not
lost—though clearly litigants in the Seventh Circuit are on notice that blanket
denials of discovery demands, even for sensitive research, will not be automati-
cally approved.
Rulings in the Eleventh Circuit also offer some hope for researchers.  Since
that court hears appeals in most suits against the Centers for Disease Control
(“CDC”), it is hardly a stranger to conflicts between scholars and subpoenas.
The hallmark case in that circuit involved claims against Procter & Gamble re-
sulting from toxic shock syndrome,25 but the right asserted was the protection of
research done by a government agency not by a private researcher.  Yet the
Eleventh Circuit accepted the CDC’s plea to keep confidential the identity of
subjects who had taken part in the toxic shock studies, even though the subjects
had apparently not been given express pledges of anonymity.  In reaching the
result, the Eleventh Circuit stressed two factors: first, that the CDC’s mission
was to protect the health of the U.S. public through “scientific and social re-
search supported by a population willing to submit to in-depth questioning”;
and second, that subjects had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality even
in the absence of express promises that their names would not be revealed. 26
The early 1980s brought another notable case.  A Michigan State University
professor named Snyder published a study of the road-worthiness of  the  infa-
mous Jeep CJ-5, focusing on the vehicle’s propensity to roll over.  American
Motors Company (“AMC”) and injured motorists who sued AMC repeatedly
sought access to the data behind Snyder’s published conclusions.  The results
were mixed.  In an early round, the company prevailed, though only after disa-
vowing any desire to discover “confidential sources” and agreeing to the re-
moval before discovery of the names of any individual accident victims who
had been the subject of the study.27  Later, when AMC took a harder line, a
federal judge in Arizona quashed the company’s subpoena for Snyder’s data,
noting “the potential for a chilling effect on research.”28  The court cautioned
that, despite the absence of a blanket privilege “discovery offers an avenue for
indirect harassment of researchers whose published work points to defects in
products or practices.  There exists also a potential for harassment of members
of the public who volunteer, under a promise of confidentiality, to provide in-
formation for use in such studies.”
29
B.  More Recent Years
The latest rounds of litigation add two other issues—the status and interests
                                                          
24. Id. at 565.
25. Farnsworth v. Procter and Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985).
26. Id. at 1547.
27. Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
28. Snyder v. Am. Motors Corp., 115 F.R.D. 211, 215 (D. Ariz. 1987).
29. Id. at 216.
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of graduate students as scholars, and the especially intense dispute between re-
searchers and the tobacco industry.  In both areas, there are intriguing splits
among courts.
1.  Graduate Students as Scholars.  The first graduate student case dealt with
a doctoral student at the State University of New York at Stony Brook who had
kept a detailed journal in preparing his dissertation.  Among his notes were
recollections taken while working as a waiter at a Long Island restaurant that
was later destroyed by a very suspicious fire.  A federal grand jury investigating
the fire subpoenaed the graduate student and his journal.  The student agreed
to appear and testify at length about his recollections of the restaurant and its
employees, but, claiming a scholar’s privilege, he refused to produce the
journal.
When the grand jury pressed for the journal, the trial court ruled in the stu-
dent’s favor30—partly because he had been so forthcoming about his own rec-
ollections, and partly because the judge recognized how deeply a compelled
disclosure of this type might undermine the scholarly process:
Affording social scientists protected freedom is essential if we are to understand how
our own and other societies operate.  Recognized by cultural anthropologists since at
least the turn of the century as a basic tool, fieldwork is used widely in other disci-
plines, particularly in sociology and political science.  In order to work effectively re-
searchers must record observations, communications and personal reactions contem-
poraneously and accurately.31
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed and
held that the grand jury could obtain the journal.  Although he lost the battle,
the recalcitrant scholar may have won at least a part of the war.  The Second
Circuit acknowledged there might be a scholar’s privilege but felt the condi-
tions for claiming it had not been met in this case.  To recognize such a privi-
lege, absent a strong and detailed showing of the adverse effects of compelled
disclosure on the research, “would require us to create virtually an unqualified
and indeterminate immunity attaching generally to all academically related in-
quiries upon the bald assertion that someone was promised confidentiality in
connection with the study.”
32
The Second Circuit was not prepared to go that far.  However, the district
judge’s approach had raised “an arguable question as to the validity of a quali-
fied privilege where a serious academic inquiry is undertaken pursuant to a
considered research plan in which the need for confidentiality is tangibly re-
lated to the accuracy or completeness of the study.” 33  Recognition of such a
privilege—“if it exists”—was left for another day and a stronger record on the
hazards of disclosure.  Even then, the Second Circuit warned that such a shield
could be no broader than absolutely essential—in this case, for example, it
would cover only those portions of the journal to which the interests of confi-
                                                          
30. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. Id. at 993.
32. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1984).
33. Id.
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dentiality unmistakably applied.34
Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, a superficially similar claim fared less
well for a graduate student.  A Washington State University doctoral student
was called before a federal grand jury that was probing a destructive raid on the
university’s laboratory animal facilities conducted by the Animal Liberation
Front (“ALF”).  A prime suspect in the case was a member of the ALF who
had house-sat the graduate student’s residence during his summer absence.
The graduate student and his wife, who were clearly not suspects as the raid oc-
curred before they returned to campus, were initially interviewed by govern-
ment agents.  When the graduate student was later called before the grand jury,
he balked, claiming that such an inquiry into his conversations with the suspect
would invade his sociological research and would compel a breach of protected
confidentiality as he had discussed the suspect’s connections to the ALF while
researching and writing a book about militant environmental groups.
The district court rejected the claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed.35  This appeals court was far less sympathetic
than the Second Circuit to even the bare possibility of a scholar’s privilege to
confidentially obtained information.  Since journalists had long ago been de-
nied such a shield by the Supreme Court’s decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,36
scholars and researchers could not claim a privilege because their claim would
be no stronger than a reporter’s.  While other federal courts had occasionally
recognized journalists’ claims for protection, such cases were held to have re-
flected unusual or extenuating factors.37  Nor was the Ninth Circuit persuaded
by what the Second Circuit had said about the Stony Brook graduate student’s
journal; according to the Ninth Circuit, that case did no more than recognize a
possible basis for a claim the record did not support.  No other court seemed to
have gone even that far, leaving the Ninth Circuit quite free to reject any such
claim in the case.38
2.  Tobacco Research as the Target.  It would be surprising if the tobacco
companies had not aggressively sought research data that might aid their cause.
Indeed, they have sought it, ending in mixed results for scientists who have
resisted those demands.  In an early important case, a New York trial court
rejected a cigarette manufacturer’s efforts to obtain massive amounts of data
on the effects of smoking on those exposed to asbestos.  A major basis for the
refusal to permit discovery was the court’s recognition of the recalcitrant
scholar’s “interest in academic freedom.”39  The state court expressly
acknowledged the validity of claims both by the American Cancer Society,
which funded much of the research, and by the university at which the studies
                                                          
34. Id. at 225-26.
35. Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994).
36. 408 U.S. 665 (1971).
37. Id. at 401-02.
38. Scarce, 5 F.3d at 403.
39. In re Application of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1987).
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were conducted:
While these medical investigations are still in progress, they should not be subjected
to examination and criticism by people whose interests are arguably antithetical to the
medical scientists.  It would have the effect of denying to these doctors the opportu-
nity of first publication of their studies.  It could also have a chilling effect and dis-
courage future scientific endeavors.40
This sympathetic ruling turned out to be a rather pyrrhic victory in light of
later developments between the same parties in the federal courts.  The district
court granted the subpoena, though the names of subjects and other sensitive
information were redacted by a protective order.41  Affirming the order, the
Second Circuit rejected the pleas of non-party scientists that were similar to
those the state judge had honored, noting only that “the public has an interest
in resolving disputes on the basis of accurate information.”42  The appeals court
did insist, however, that the subpoena be narrowed to focus on research mate-
rials used by the principal researcher in preparing articles published “some
years ago.”43  Thus, the worst potential damage to be feared from such a discov-
ery order—disruption or distortion of current, yet unpublished research—was
avoided both by the terms of the protective order and by narrowing the scope
of the subpoena.
One later tobacco case also marks a victory for the researcher.  Dr. Paul
Fischer, a professor at the Medical College of Georgia, conducted and pub-
lished research about the effects of cigarette advertising on young children.  In
the course of a California citizen’s civil suit alleging unfair business practices
against R. J. Reynolds, the tobacco company sought to depose Fischer in Geor-
gia.  Fischer resisted, and the state trial court quashed the subpoena.44  A Geor-
gia appeals court sustained the scientist’s claims, finding that Fischer’s data had
minimal bearing on the core of the California case.45  “Since the effect of the
advertising is not in issue,” concluded the court, “any discovery from Fischer
would not be reasonably likely to lead to admissible evidence.”46
The tobacco giant, not so readily rebuffed, pursued a freedom of informa-
tion claim against Fischer and the medical college where the research had been
conducted (and which maintained some of the files).  The state’s attorneys gave
Fischer little solace or support, insisting at one point that he would be sus-
pended within forty-eight hours if he refused to accede to demands to release
the data.  The files were then turned over to the court pending resolution of the
conflicting claims.  In the summer of 1994, the trial judge ruled against Fischer
on the freedom of information claim, and Reynolds immediately obtained the
data it had sought.47  Thus, in the end, sensitive research material, which had
                                                          
40. Id. at 733-34.
41. In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d 1520, 1525 (2d Cir. 1989).
42. Id. at 1529.
43. Id.
44. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Fischer, 427 S.E.2d 810, 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
45. Id. at 812.
46. Id.
47. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 38-40; see also Paul M. Fischer, Science and Subpoenas: When Do
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survived the discovery process, fell to a freedom of information claim.
The results in the cases are, as suggested, quite mixed.  Researchers and
scholars have enjoyed some victories, but have also suffered some damaging
defeats.  Yet, what remains notably absent from this field of the law is anything
like a common law privilege—much less a constitutional privilege—for the re-
search process and those who guide it.  The prospects for such broad protection
have been clouded by several cases in closely related areas, to which we now
turn.
III
ANALOGIES AND RELATED ISSUES
Quite understandably, courts reviewing challenges to research subpoenas
have sought guidance from the closest analogous field, that of journalists’ con-
fidential sources.  There have been several notable developments in journal-
ism’s confidential source law during the past quarter century.  Perhaps the most
important decision was the Supreme Court’s 1972 rejection in Branzburg v.
Hayes of a privilege for news-gatherers who had been called before a grand
jury and asked to reveal confidential sources.48  Several factors shaped that de-
cision: the high order of the grand jury’s historic role in developing truth; the
absence of any familiar basis for such a privilege; and a sense that such matters
were best left to lawmakers (since, in fact, many states had adopted “shield
laws,” which protected journalists from such forced breaches of confidential-
ity).  Justice Powell, concurring separately, wished to keep open the possibility
that a journalist might need protection if there were abuse of such process or
harassment of a particular news-gatherer.
If journalists lost the first skirmish in the Branzburg case, they may well
have won the war through a host of later cases.  While courts have consistently
declined to confer privileged status upon the gathering of news, they have re-
jected many subpoenas—some because they were excessively burdensome,
others because the nexus was not firmly established between the information
and the party’s needs, and still others because the information could be ob-
tained through alternative and less intrusive channels.  Thus, over the years,
journalists have fared far better than anyone reading only the Branzburg deci-
sion could have expected.49
Some courts have applied Branzburg by analogy to research disclosure is-
sues.50  It is thus fair to ask how far Branzburg’s rejection of a reporter’s privi-
                                                          
the Courts Become Instruments of Manipulation?, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (SUMMER 1996).
For an account of a related Massachusetts case involving a fellow researcher, see Marcia Barinaga,
Who Controls A Researcher’s Files?, SCI., June 19, 1992, at 1620-21.
48. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
49. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972); Robert M. O’Neil, Shield Laws: Par-
tial Solution to a Pervasive Problem, 20 N.Y.L.F. 515 (1975).
50. See, e.g., Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1993).
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lege undermines the case for a researcher’s privilege.  Superficially, the two
situations are similar enough that a parallel disposition seems sound.  However,
there are differences that deserve more attention than they have yet received.
For example, a major premise of Branzburg was that legislatures, rather than
courts, ought to confer whatever protection a reporter needs.51  Prior to Bran-
zburg, seventeen states had in fact adopted shield laws for precisely that pur-
pose.52  Here the contrast is striking: No states have legislatively protected the
researcher in ways comparable to those reporters have enjoyed53—nor is there a
substantial prospect of such protection in the near future.
More important is the contrast between the nature of the two activities and
the potential impact upon compelled disclosure.  While a forced breach of
source confidentiality may have severe consequences for a reporter, the range
of effects upon the scientist whose research is disrupted is potentially more
devastating.  The several concerns noted at the outset—disruption of a research
program in process, partial or premature disclosure of untested findings, as well
as breaches of promised or expected confidentiality—pose an ever graver
threat to the orderly conduct of what is clearly an activity protected by the First
Amendment.
Finally, there are dispositive differences in the nature of the activities them-
selves.  News-gathering, as such, has never enjoyed clear constitutional status.
In the absence of a statutory claim of access, such as that created by freedom of
information laws, the journalist has seldom been able to claim even the limited
First Amendment protection that a researcher might be able to claim.  Re-
search is, however, a distinctly and clearly protected activity in its own right.
Thus, without in any way disparaging the basis for a reporter’s claim of confi-
dentiality, or questioning the central premise of Branzburg, a separate inquiry
in the realm of research will prove that greater protection should be afforded
researchers.
It should also be noted that the Supreme Court recently revisited the jour-
nalist’s source issue in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.54  In Cowles a reporter
promised absolute anonymity to a source who was crucial to a politically explo-
sive story.  Yet his editors insisted on naming the source, and the reporter re-
luctantly acceded. Soon after the story appeared, the source sued the newspa-
per and recovered damages for a common law breach of contract.  The
Supreme Court rejected the publisher’s First Amendment claims, seeing no
need to treat the state court’s judgment differently from run-of-the-mill con-
tract breaches.55
Although there was no occasion for the Cohen court to revisit any facet of
                                                          
51. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689-90 (1972).
52. Id. at 689 n. 27.
53. However, some medical researchers may be able to claim a privilege under broadly written
healthcare provider (as opposed to doctor) - patient privilege statutes.  See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
735, ¶ 8-802 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1996).
54. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
55. Id.
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the Branzburg case or its progeny, one might ask, nonetheless, whether Cohen
does not aid the researcher’s case ever so slightly.  The Cohen court’s deference
to a promise of anonymity might suggest that, despite Branzburg’s rejection of
the reporter’s claim to protect that relationship, the courts might be more sym-
pathetic to a researcher’s reliance on a contractual pledge, or at least the rea-
sonable expectation of a contractual commitment, not to reveal the subject’s
identity.  In the several years since Cohen, no such claim seems to have been
advanced on a research subject’s behalf, although that prospect remains open
for future pursuit.  Such a prospect also invites a concluding review of the fac-
tors that—in the continued absence of a constitutional status for research—may
favor claims raised on the research subject’s behalf.
IV
FACTORS FAVORING THE RESEARCHER
As demonstrated by the mixed record of litigation, some cases obviously
have far greater appeal to courts than others.  First, the most compelling case is
when a researcher’s relations with subjects involve not only a claim of confiden-
tiality (promised or expected) but an actual, legally recognized privilege.  If the
scholar is a physician or an attorney who has gathered sensitive data from per-
sons who are actually patients or clients, courts would of course bar any access
to such files.  If some, but not all, of a group of subjects could claim such a
privilege, the case for denying discovery would seem comparably compelling—
if only because the need to edit around the legally privileged material would
likely create a burden so substantial that the entire request should be refused.
Second, there is the pervasive issue of confidentiality beyond the core of le-
gal privilege.  Several courts (especially in cases involving the CDC) have noted
the value of preserving anonymity, not only when subjects receive an express
pledge, but also when they reasonably expect their participation in a major
study would entail no risk of disclosure.56  Here the interests are not solely, or
perhaps even primarily, those of the researcher or of the immediate subjects.
Rather, it is research in general and the public interest in not deterring future
participants in studies that will benefit the public health and welfare.  Thus, it is
not surprising that several courts have quashed or severely limited subpoenas
even where there was no proof of an express promise of anonymity, but simply
a reasonable expectation or likelihood of such treatment.
Third, a few courts have heeded the scholar’s plea not to disrupt research in
progress or divert time and energy from pursuit of knowledge to less urgent
endeavors.57  In cases where such disruptive or distracting effects can be dem-
onstrated, courts may be disposed to deny discovery altogether, or at least to
fashion protective orders that would sharply reduce such risks by, for example,
                                                          
56. See, e.g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir. 1985); Lampshire v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
57. See e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982); In re R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 518 N.Y.S.2d at 733-34.
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confining discovery to data tied to already published findings.58  The potential
for scholars to raise such concerns as these warrants further attention both by
lawyers and courts.59
Fourth, the potential to raise the researcher’s “bystander” status has not
been fully tapped.  The scholar is hardly ever a party to the proceeding and
usually has no economic stake in the litigation.  Occasionally, demands upon
researchers pertain to information so remote to the case’s legal issues that a
court will summarily refuse disclosure on grounds of relevance without analyz-
ing the potential burden or other factors.60  Other courts will at least recognize
the “noncombatant” status of the researcher as a factor weighing in the balance
against disclosure.61  However, this factor does seem to deserve more scrutiny
than it has typically received.  It may also help to distance the researcher’s
claims from those of others (even journalists) whose involvement in the merits
of the case may be more immediate.
Finally, something should be said about the basic relationship between the
demand for data and the research enterprise.  This factor may help to distin-
guish the most recent, and in some ways most troublesome, of the federal cases.
As discussed above, sociology graduate student James (Rick) Scarce found lit-
tle sympathy in a court of appeals, which summarily affirmed his contempt sen-
tence for refusing to tell a grand jury about conversations with his friend and
house-sitter who was suspected of raiding the Washington State University
animal laboratories.62  The Ninth Circuit’s tone contrasted sharply with that of
the Second Circuit in the superficially similar case of the Stony Brook doctoral
student who withheld his journal from the grand jury investigation of a restau-
rant arson.63  There were, however, some potentially important differences be-
tween the two cases.  Scarce was not a wholly detached and disinterested by-
stander, as was the Stony Brook student.  Nor was the link between the
requested information and the research quite as clear in the Washington case.
While the Ninth Circuit never implied bad faith or suggested that Scarce was
hiding behind a scholar’s claim of privilege, the facts at least create such an in-
ference.  The circumstances suggest a possible basis for distinguishing a case
that is likely to be hereafter troublesome.
                                                          
58. E.g., In re American Tobacco Co., 880 F.2d at 1529.
59. See Virgina G. Maurer, Compelling the Expert Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 111-16 (1984); Mark Labaton, Note, Discovery and Tes-
timony of Unretained Experts: Creating a Clear and Equitable Standard to Govern Compliance with
Subpoenas, 1987 DUKE L.J. 140, 143.
60. E.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Fischer, 427 S.E.2d 810 (1993).
61. E.g., Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
62. Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397, 399-400 (9th  Cir. 1993).
63. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984).
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V
COULD IT BE CONSTITUTIONAL?
The prospect of First Amendment protection for research is as appealing as
it is elusive.  For reasons we have explored, the case for bringing scholarly in-
quiry within the ambit of free speech seems compelling.  The absence of such
protection for news-gathering is not dispositive.  Indeed, even a court that con-
sistently rejects constitutional claims of journalists seeking First Amendment
protection for confidential sources and other sensitive information might con-
ceivably be swayed by the slightly different and arguably stronger claims of the
researcher seeking to resist compelled disclosure.  Thus, the research commu-
nity rightly harbors some hope for a constitutional privilege, while continuing
to seek protection through less exalted means in the real world, where no such
safeguard yet exists.
Should there ever be a stronger prospect of First Amendment protection,
several issues would need to be addressed in the definition of such a privilege.
For example, types of inquiry and researchers entitled to such protection must
be delineated.  Courts should be able to distinguish under a constitutional stan-
dard, much as they have done in the non-constitutional setting, between serious
scholarly inquiry of a kind that deserves such a shield and merely casual or un-
systematic probing that would fall outside the logic of such protection.64  On the
other hand, it would be unreasonable to confine such safeguards to established
senior researchers; there are situations (as the Stony Brook case suggests)
where graduate students or other participants in the research enterprise should
be equally entitled to protection from disclosure.
The scope of any such privilege would also need close attention.  Not all
materials that might be of interest to litigants are equally deserving of such pro-
tection.  The clearest case for constitutional safeguards would exist, as under
the current framework, where compelled disclosure would be severely disrup-
tive of the inquiry process or of the researcher’s relations with subjects or col-
leagues.  Diverting or halting a study in progress should be especially suspect
under a constitutional shield.  An explicit (or strongly implied) promise of con-
fidentiality to subjects would create an appealing case for First Amendment in-
tervention—not only to safeguard the researcher’s free expression, but that of
the subjects who have chosen to “speak” on condition that they not be identi-
fied in ways that might evoke risk or reprisal.  Where an expectation of confi-
dentiality rests on less solid ground, or where the hazards of naming subjects
are less acute, the case would be correspondingly less persuasive.  Unpub-
lished—and, more importantly, yet untested—data would pose a more compel-
ling case for First Amendment protection than published data or materials re-
lated to already published studies and findings.  Much as with the non-
                                                          
64. Cf. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-95 (1993) (establishing
guidelines to determine what constitutes scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge under the
Federal Rules of Evidence that may be helpful in deciding what type of research may be characterized
as systematic or scholarly inquiry).
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constitutional analysis, several factors would shape the scope and definition of
any such privilege.
If courts ever brought research squarely under the First Amendment for
such purposes, the other policy factors in the current equation would also be
helpful: How critical is the moving party’s need for the requested data and what
alternative sources (if any) exist that would spare the researcher and the proc-
ess of inquiry from interference?  While these considerations have evolved in
the absence of constitutional protection, they are closely analogous to questions
that courts consistently and appropriately ask in First Amendment cases.  Thus,
they should be as much a part of the constitutional privilege as they are of the
current analytical process.
A final and practical issue should be raised: How much difference would a
First Amendment privilege make?  As demonstrated, some courts have shown
greater sympathy for the researcher and reached results that could hardly be
more favorable if they rested squarely on the First Amendment.  Other courts’
decisions were less receptive to the process of inquiry and its needs, and seem
barely to appreciate the difference between serious scholarship and, for exam-
ple, commercial market research.  It is in those situations that a recognized
constitutional privilege for scholarly inquiry would have genuine value.  Such a
privilege would hardly ensure perfect consistency, any more than it does in ar-
eas that clearly fall under the First Amendment, but it would be helpful.  That
prospect should suffice to retain our interest.
VI
CONCLUSION
The status of the scholar’s or researcher’s right to resist compelled disclo-
sure remains tenuous and uncertain, as it was when the first case reached the
courts a quarter century ago.  There has been, however, valuable experience
and even some helpful guidance from a number of courts.  The subject matter
of the targeted research will surely continue to reflect the paramount issues of
the day—much as it has evolved over the years from Vietnamese villagers and
Agent Orange, to unsafe automobiles, to toxic shock, and now to smoking and
cigarettes.  What should not change is the persistent and conscientious pursuit
by scholars and their lawyers of whatever protection the courts may afford to
the quest for knowledge.
